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ABSTRACT 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the impact of elections on board member 
changes and its relationship with profit-oriented performance of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), thus providing new insights on political tie heterogeneity. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a unique hand-collected dataset of 200 SOEs in six 
countries of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) from 2010 till 2014, 
we find that board member changes within SOEs, unlike for private enterprises, are 
politically motivated rather than performance induced. We reveal that SOEs with higher 
levels of board member changes encounter lower productivity and profitability levels. These 
findings suggest that political interference via board member changes causes organizational 
inefficiencies and poor SOE performance. Moreover, the results show that board member 
changes are insignificant for performance of large SOEs and SOEs governed by independent 
government body. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study reveals an indirect channel for political 
interference, thus contributing to greater understanding of political tie heterogeneity. 
Moreover, our study is the first to link political interference and performance of SOEs 
through introduction of election cycles into the board member changes-performance 
relationship.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results of this study provide insights for policymakers 
who are interested in enhancement of SOEs’ performance. They suggest ways in which board 
appointment procedures should be altered as to be insulated from political interference. In 
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addition, they show boards how they can lower the negative consequences of frequent board 
member changes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The political view of state ownership asserts that political ties are established through 
appointments of politically like-minded individuals or bureaucrats that follow certain political 
interests (Boycko, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1996). The primary goal of these appointees is 
fulfilment of their personal and/or political interests that are not in line with the enterprise 
value maximization objective (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994, 1997). Moreover, these appointees might lack the appropriate knowledge, 
competences and experience for carrying out board responsibilities (Vagliasindi, 2008; World 
Bank, 2014). In that way, governments constitute SOE boards to ensure that they fulfil their 
interests even when this may cause negative performance (World Bank, 2014).  
The main focus of the past empirical research on this topic is related to personal level 
political ties and government ownership ties within SOEs. Researchers use political 
connections of CEOs (e.g., Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012), percentage of 
politicians/government officials on boards (e.g., Menozzi, Gutierrez Urtiaga, & Vannoni, 
2011; Okhmatovskiy, 2010), or unlawful discharge of a board chairman or CEO (e.g., Ding, 
Jia, Wu, & Zhang, 2014) as political interference proxies. These proxies neglect the existence 
of political ties heterogeneity. Sun, Mellahi, Wright, and Xu (2015) explain that the past 
research has failed to recognize the informal linkages that might exist between business 
people and politicians. Therefore, the main question is whether political interference goes 
beyond the establishment of formal political ties and, if so, what kind of informal channels 
might exist. 
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Vickers and Yarrow (1988) suggest that for SOEs, board member changes comply with 
political rather than market forces. Government officials and political appointees are replaced 
whenever a new government representative or ruling political party is elected (Kernaghan, 
1986). In that way, political establishments distance themselves from individuals connected 
to the previous political administration (Sun et al., 2015), who are unlikely to show loyalty 
and impartiality for the new political party in power (Kernaghan, 1986). Consequently, board 
member changes are triggered by election cycles, which thus represent a hidden channel for 
political interference. In addition, board members without direct political ties could suffer 
from “guilt by association”. This refers to punishment of individuals or organizations because 
of their prior relationship with illegitimate, disadvantaged, or undesirable individuals or 
networks (Labianca & Brass, 2006). Hence, even non-politically connected board members 
might be replaced. 
Politically induced board member changes might indicate that the likelihood of board 
member discharge due to poor performance is much lower for SOEs. Nevertheless, political 
interference via board member changes may lead to operational inefficiencies and poor SOE 
performance. The nonexistence of perfect substitution for individual board members creates a 
time lag before an efficient decision-making process is re-established (Sharma, 1985). 
Moreover, new board members need time to adapt in order to be able to positively contribute 
to the decision-making processes (Smith et al., 1994). Recognizing that performance depends 
on board decisions, politically motivated board member changes might have negative effects 
on SOE performance. The magnitude of these effects could be influenced by the interplay of 
the SOE’s political importance and the government ownership ties. 
In this study we examine the relationship between election cycles and board member changes 
and we analyse how that relationship impacts the performance of SOEs in six countries of the 
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former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Our hand-collected dataset has financial 
and board member information for 200 SOEs from 2010 to 2014. We examine election‒board 
member changes and board member changes‒performance relationship using panel data fixed 
effects and a panel data instrumental variable (IV) estimator, respectively.  
The decision to investigate SOEs in countries of the former SFRY is based on several 
reasons. First, these countries had similar legal frameworks, market rules and ways in which 
they govern state ownership (Horvat, 1971). Coherent patterns could be depicted by looking 
at the level of state ownership, their number, and the sectors in which they operate (Bicanic, 
2010). Even though each of these countries chose its own path after achieving independence, 
all of them still face similar problems (e.g., level of indebtedness, staggered economic 
activity, and political instability). Second, in spite of privatization efforts during the past 20 
to 30 years, the degree of state ownership in these countries is still high. Despite the fact that 
absolute numbers of SOEs in each of these countries might indicate that the degree of state 
ownership is quite distinctive, when we take into account the employment percentage for 
which SOEs are accountable, similarities become apparent.1 Third, our data reveal that 
countries within our sample have analogous levels of board member changes. Therefore, the 
six countries of the former SFRY provide a unique set-up for examining the influence of 
board member changes on performance of SOEs.  
The results show that board member changes within SOEs are politically motivated rather 
than performance induced. We also uncover the hidden channel of political interference via 
board member changes. Furthermore, we find a negative and significant relationship between 
politically induced board member changes and performance of SOEs. The relationship is 
stronger for operating than for financial performance. Our estimates also indicate a greater 
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presence of political interference in small and medium size SOEs. Additionally, we reveal 
that board member changes are insignificant for the performance of SOEs governed by 
independent government body.  
This research contributes to the existing literature in several important aspects. First, we 
respond to a recent call by Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, and Wright (2016) to fill in the gap 
regarding the nature and drivers of board turnover within SOEs. We offer a detailed analysis 
and empirical evidence for Vickers and Yarrow’s (1988) theoretical standing that board 
member changes within SOEs comply with election cycles (political force) rather than poor 
performance results (market force). Second, we introduce politically induced board member 
changes as a new proxy for political interference within SOEs. With this proxy we recognize 
that political interference goes beyond personal political ties of CEOs, board chairmen, or a 
portion of board members and takes into account the dynamics of the entire board. Third, we 
complement research studies on the political view of state ownership (e.g., Krueger, 1990; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) and the political embeddedness perspective (e.g., Michelson, 2007) 
with our novel empirical approach to political interference. More specifically, we investigate 
the link between political interference and performance of SOEs by introducing the election 
cycles into the board‒performance relationship. Fourth, we contribute to the literature about 
the factors that influence SOE performance. We show that political interference via unstable 
board membership engenders poor performance. Frequent board member changes disrupt 
board dynamics, thus creating numerous operational inefficiencies (Sharma, 1985). Finally, 
our findings provide solid grounds for policy changes suggesting ways in which SOE 
performance can be improved.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature and 
develops hypotheses. Section three explains data and empirical strategy. Section four presents 
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empirical results and discussion. Section five concludes and provides implications for future 
research. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Politically induced board member changes  
The primary goal of politicians is attainment, exploitation and maintenance of power 
(Buchanan & Tullock, 1962). In order to accomplish that, politicians use SOEs for personal 
or political gains that are not in line with the profit maximization objective as implied by the 
political view of state ownership (Chong & Lopez-de-Silanes, 2005; Krueger, 1990; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Consequently, board positions are reserved for politically loyal and 
obedient individuals (World Bank, 2006) or bureaucrats who are ready to pursue certain 
political interests (Boycko et al., 1996). The practice of appointing board members on the 
basis of their political allegiance and not qualifications and business acumen is one of the 
most profound forms of political interference (Barberis, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Greene, 
2014; Wong, 2004).  
Politically construed board appointments enable politicians to influence and control the 
decision-making processes within SOEs. For that reason, government officials do not have an 
incentive to appoint the best candidates for board membership as these decisions need to have 
a political justification (Hu & Leung, 2012). Opper, Nee, and Brehm (2015) argue that 
political connections and political evaluations are the only parameters for selection of 
government officials and managers. They explain that political leaders tend to allocate key 
positions to like-minded individuals with whom they can associate their interests. 
Furthermore, politicians and individuals with alike interests dominate SOE boards 
(Yoshikawa, Zhu, & Wang, 2014). Hence, the shift of political power or even substitution of 
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political leaders triggers replacements of government officials and political appointees 
(Kernaghan, 1986).  
Along those lines, Vickers and Yarrow (1988) argue that within SOEs, board turnover 
complies with political rather than market forces. They suggest that board member changes 
within SOEs are caused by political disagreement/lack of political obedience/election cycles 
rather than poor performance results. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find that Greek elections 
won by an opposing party result in the overturn of top managers within SOEs. With board 
member changes, politicians want to avert any likelihood that their power might be 
destabilized and ensure a network of loyal individuals in key positions (Dittmer & Wu, 1995; 
Li & Bachman, 1989). Consequently, change of politically connected board members due to 
election cycles can be observed as a hidden channel for political interference. To gain 
additional insights, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Board member changes within SOEs are politically motivated rather   
than performance induced. 
Performance and political interference via board member changes 
Political interference via boards and political connections can create both, benefits and costs, 
as suggested by the political embeddedness perspective. On the one hand, political ties are 
considered to be a relational asset that provides enterprises with access to valuable 
governmental resources, thus leading to a better enterprise performance (Boubakri, Cosset, & 
Saffar, 2012; Faccio, 2006; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Several studies demonstrate that 
enterprises benefit from political connections through preferential access to financing (e.g., 
Chen, Shen, & Lin, 2014; Dinc, 2005; Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Khwaja & 
Mian, 2005), increased probability for getting government contracts (e.g., Goldman, Rocholl, 
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& So, 2009; Goldman, So, & Rocholl, 2013) or subsidies (e.g., Wu & Cheng, 2011), payment 
of lower taxes (e.g., Adhikari, Derashid, & Zhang, 2006), lower regulatory enforcement (e.g., 
Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001), possibilities for influencing regulatory policies (e.g., Hillman, 
2005), and provision of bail-out for financially troubled enterprises (e.g., Faccio, 2006). On 
the other hand, political ties enable government representatives to manipulate SOEs’ 
resources to promote political or personal interests with negative consequences on SOE 
performance (Krueger, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Political ties in those cases cause 
excessive employment levels (e.g., Menozzi et al., 2011), distorted investment efficiency, and 
lower capital allocation efficiency (e.g., Chen, Sun, Tang, & Wu, 2011). The costs of political 
ties might outweigh the benefits with presence of government officials on boards 
(Okhmatovskiy, 2010).  
Unlike for private enterprises, governance of SOEs is in the hands of three different interest 
groups: citizens as principals and ultimate owners, governments as fiduciary agents, and 
boards as direct agents (Capobianco & Christiansen, 2011; Musacchio, Pineda Ayerbe, & 
Garcia, 2015). The agency theory asserts that fiduciary and direct agents may choose to 
pursue some private benefits at the expense of wealth maximization for principals (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fear of dismissal is one of the main tools for 
alignment of interests of agents and principals, which ensures that managers work in the best 
interest of the owners (Holstrom, 1979; Ross, 1973).  
Politically motivated board member changes imply that one of the main tools for alignment 
of interests of agents and principals, fear of dismissal, might not be effectuated in the case of 
SOEs. Several authors explain that SOE boards lack the managerial incentives for pursuance 
of efficiency and profitability objectives (Boardman & Vining, 1989; Boubakri, Cosset, & 
Saffar, 2008; Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). This is due to political interference, which lowers the 
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likelihood of discharge because of poor performance results. Therefore, the question in the 
case of SOEs is whether politically induced board member changes might cause a negative 
effect on their performance. Sharma (1985) argues that frequent board member changes cause 
inconsistent decision-making processes that result in organizational inefficiencies and poor 
performance. An enterprise’s performance depends on board decisions, while board decisions 
rely on collective judgment and deliberation, which alters with board member changes. 
Hence, decisions are kept in a state of flux and away from real implementation, which in the 
end impinges on the enterprise’s performance (Sharma, 1985). Crutchley, Garner, and 
Marshall (2002) find that greater board stability is associated with enhanced enterprise 
performance. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Politically induced board member changes are negatively associated 
with SOE performance. 
In addition to what is noted above, the literature indicates that politicians might use the 
economic power of large enterprises to improve the likelihood of their re-election (Bertrand, 
Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2007). Moreover, they might influence the corporate decisions 
of large SOEs in order to preserve their political power (Bertrand et al., 2007). For those 
reasons, large SOEs are considered to be one of the essential trophies in the aftermath of 
elections. The previous research studies suggest that politically experienced directors are 
prevalent in large enterprises (Faccio, 2006; Su & Fung, 2013). The greater number of 
politically connected directors is found within large SOEs, due to their political importance 
(Menozzi et al., 2011). Contrary to that, small and medium SOEs are less important because 
of their limited market power and curtailed influence on the re-election outcome. Considering 
that politicians appoint like-minded individuals to key positions (Opper et al., 2015) and that 
political appointees are replaced after elections (Kernaghan, 1986), greater numbers of board 
12 
 
member changes are expected among large SOEs. Consequently, unstable boards of large 
SOEs might endanger their performance as a result of a considerable number of short-term 
decisions beneficial for politicians. However, as media are more likely to investigate large 
SOEs (O’Connell, 1995), politicians might opt to interfere with boards of small and medium 
size SOEs. In order to investigate these implications of the literature, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3a. Politically induced board member changes are negatively associated 
with the performance of large SOEs.   
Hypothesis 3b. Politically induced board member changes are less negatively 
associated with the performance of small and medium SOEs than of large SOEs. 
Government ownership ties and political interference via ownership models 
The research studies on government ownership ties analyse how state ownership affects 
performance (e.g., Ding et al., 2014), how government-business networks operate in cases of 
minority state ownership (e.g., Inoue et al., 2013; Wang, Hong, Kafouros, & Wright, 2012), 
and whether interaction of personal and ownership ties produces some differentiating effects 
(e.g., Sun et al., 2015). Furthermore, researchers recognize that political connections to local 
and central governments can have distinct effects on enterprise performance (e.g., Fan, 
Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Zheng, Singh, & Mitchell, 2015).  Zheng et al. (2015) found that 
political ties to local governments improve enterprise performance because of the closer 
alignment between SOEs’ and politicians’ interests.   
Governments can exercise their political or personal interests via interference of ownership 
entities in day-to-day SOEs’ operations and/or board nomination procedures (World Bank, 
2006). The property-rights theory explains that non-transferability of SOEs’ ownership leads 
13 
 
to the lack of incentives for government entities to perform their monitoring function 
comprehensively (De Alessi, 1969, 1973). Furthermore, Wong (2004) argues that politicians 
and bureaucrats who sit on these governmental bodies are poor overseers of state ownership. 
Therefore, the level of political interference depends on the ownership model adopted by 
governments as well as its structure.  
Governments can choose between three different ownership models. They can opt for a 
decentralized model where line ministries are accountable for SOEs (Musacchio et al., 2015; 
OECD, 2012). As the second option they have a dual model in which line ministry and 
“central” ministry (usually Ministry of Finance) jointly exercise ownership rights (OECD, 
2012). Governments can also decide to adopt a centralized model where an independent 
government body is responsible for ownership function over all or a vast majority of SOEs 
(PwC, 2015; World Bank, 2014). Table 1 reveals that countries within our sample have 
distinctive governing models for state ownership. In Slovenia and Croatia, an independent 
government body governs SOEs, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina and FYR Macedonia line 
ministries bear the responsibility of managing state ownership. The government de facto 
plays the key role in governing SOEs in Serbia and Montenegro (government ownership 
model), despite the fact that this responsibility is de jure in hands of line ministries.   
The theory and literature clearly indicate that a centralized model should be adopted by 
governments as it curtails opportunities for political interference (World Bank, 2014). 
Contrary to that, several government bodies in decentralized and dual models can compete 
for influence over SOEs, creating contradictory and conflicting goals that can undermine 
their performance (Musacchio et al., 2015; World Bank, 2006). Furthermore, board member 
nomination and appointment procedures within centralized ownership models are insulated 
from political pressures since they are based on professional criteria - expertise and 
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knowledge of individuals (World Bank, 2014). For all other ownership models, ministry 
cabinets interfere in these processes, thus enabling appointments of politically connected 
individuals. The nomination procedures as well as criteria for board membership outlined in 
Table 1 imply that politicians in Slovenia and Croatia have a rather limited space for 
interference. The independent government body conducts public calls for board members on 
the basis of predetermined criteria. Serbia and Montenegro follow completely opposite 
procedures within their quasi decentralized model. The nomination procedure in these 
countries is led by the governmental committee or office for appointments, which enables 
direct political interference. Therefore, SOEs in countries with centralized ownership models 
should experience a lower level of political interference, and thus a limited effect on their 
performance. In accordance with the previous literature and implications regarding different 
models adopted by countries within our sample, we introduce our last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4. The performance of SOEs in countries with government ownership 
models suffers more from politically induced board member changes than does the 
performance of SOEs in countries with centralized ownership models. 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Collection 
Our sample contains financial and board membership data about 200 SOEs from six countries 
of the former SFRY for the period 2010-2014. We construct our sample through extraction of 
data from the Amadeus database on the basis of two criteria. The first criterion is that the 
enterprise operates in one of the six former SFRY’s countries. The second criterion is that the 
ultimate owner of the enterprise is public authority, state, or government with a minimum 
50.01% of direct or indirect ownership. We use this cut-off point for three main reasons. 
First, OECD (2015) in its guidelines on SOEs’ corporate governance, defines a SOE as an 
enterprise with 100% or majority state ownership. Second, this cut-off point conveys 
effective government control. Third, prior empirical research demonstrates that enterprises 
with minority state ownership have a lower number of political connections, thus implying a 
lower level of political interference (e.g., Wu et al., 2012). 
Based on the country and ownership criteria, 556 enterprises are identified as state-owned. 
From that sample we exclude all enterprises that declared bankruptcy, as their real 
performance could not be observed. Moreover, we delimit our sample by removing 
enterprises from the financial sector (e.g., banks, insurance enterprises), since they have 
distinct financial reporting and higher levels of corporate governance due to legal 
requirements (e.g,. Goldeng, Grunfeld, & Benito, 2004; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). In 
addition, we remove all providers of health, social, and cultural services since they are 
established in order to achieve some non-commercial objectives (e.g., Bozec, Breton, & Cote, 
2002). Lastly, we exclude enterprises for which data are not available (e.g., Faccio, 2010). 
After applying all of these restrictions, our final sample encompasses 200 SOEs. Even though 
it may be argued that this sample is small, several facts need to be taken into account. First, 
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we exclude SOEs whose inclusion might lead to misleading results following the implications 
of previous research studies mentioned above. Second, availability of data for SOEs 
worldwide is rather scarce, and we include all SOEs for which data are available. Third, our 
sample is larger or comparable to the sample sizes of similar studies (e.g., Menozzi et al. 
(2011) employ a sample of 114 Italian SOEs).   
We download standardized balance sheet and profit and loss items, ownership data, industry 
code, date of incorporation, number of employees, and board membership information from 
the database. We fill in any missing financial data with data from SOE annual reports. For 
enterprises that do not report their financial data in EUR we make a conversion using 
exchange rates applied by Amadeus to ensure data standardization.  
Due to limited availability of board member data in the database, we hand-collect data on 
numerous board member characteristics (e.g., names, dates of appointment and resignation, 
political connectedness, level of education, previous/current position, subsequent position) to 
complement the missing data. The collection of board level data is based on the 
predetermined definition of boards. As already noted, SOEs can have two-tier boards 
(supervisory and management board) or one-tier boards with or without the presence of 
managing directors. In our research we follow the definition of OECD (2015) and World 
Bank (2014), and we define “board” as an enterprise body that monitors management and 
governs enterprise. Table 2 shows that the vast majority of SOEs within our sample have 
two-tier boards. In Montenegro, all SOEs follow a one-tier board system due to legal 
stipulations, while in FYR Macedonia SOEs can have one-tier or two-tier board systems 
depending on the category of SOEs to which they belong. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
For the extraction of the board-level missing data we use official financial and annual reports 
of enterprises, databases of official enterprise registry agencies, data published on stock 
exchanges, and individual decisions of shareholder assemblies on the appointment and 
resignation of board members. Overall, we have data on 2,120 board members, which makes 
our dataset the first of its kind for this part of Europe.  
Variables and Measures 
In our study we employ two performance measures, following the approach taken in previous 
research studies (e.g., Boardman & Vining, 1989; Boubakri et al., 2008; Bozec et al., 2002; 
Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001; Ding et al., 2014; Hu & Leung, 2012; Menozzi et al., 2011; 
O’Connell & Cramer, 2010). We use return on equity (ROE) as a profitability measure and 
Sales per employee as an operating and productivity measure. ROE, which is a proxy of 
return on shareholders’ investments, is computed as the ratio of net income to average total 
equity. Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of the sales over the total number of 
employees. It is a well-established fact that accounting based measures may suffer from 
financial manipulations. However, employment of standardized audited financial data 
provides sufficient reliability of these performance measures (Goldeng et al., 2004; 
O’Connell & Cramer, 2010). Despite some limitations of accounting measures, evidence 
from previous research studies implies that they are adequate proxies of economic rates of 
return (Vining & Boardman, 1992). In addition, we do not use any stock market measures 
since the vast majority of SOEs from our sample are not listed on stock exchanges, while the 
level of liquidity of traded stocks is not sufficient for valid estimations (e.g., Okhmatovskiy 
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(2010) recognizes the same problem for investigation of SOE performance and political ties 
in Russia). Moreover, Ding et al. (2014) explain that usage of market performance measures 
is not well suited for investigation of political interference. Due to efficient markets, political 
interference would be immediately reflected in stock prices. Thus, market measures might not 
grasp its effect. 
We also employ three different measures of board member changes. Board turnover is the 
percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of 
the year after spending at least one year on the board (e.g., Franks & Mayer, 2001). Board 
political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed 
year who are politically connected2 and who left at the end of the year after spending at least 
one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in 
the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. This measure is employed to grasp the 
within-year board dynamics. In order to grasp board dynamics not captured by Board 
intermediary, we employ variables that show the number of board members who left the 
board within one year (Board leavers) and the number of board members appointed in the 
same period (Board appointments). With employment of these measures, we take into 
account political connectedness of all board members, thus creating a new proxy for political 
interference.  
Bearing in mind the political view of state ownership and standing of Vickers and Yarrow 
(1988), who suggest that SOEs’ board member changes are a result of political rather than 
market forces, we employ two variables that represent political force. Parliamentary and 
Local elections are dummy variables that take value one in the year of elections and zero for 
other years.3 In addition, we use these variables as instruments for the board member 
changes‒performance relationship due to potential endogeneity issues.  
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In our models we introduce several other board characteristics as suggested in the previous 
research. Board members with short tenures cannot adapt and contribute positively to the 
board decision-making processes (Smith et al., 1994). This can create a time lag (Sharma, 
1985) with negative performance consequences. However, board members with long tenures 
are more likely to be replaced, thus increasing board member changes. Hence, we employ 
Board tenure, which is calculated as the average time that board members spent on the board 
(e.g., Ding et al., 2014; McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007). Board size is computed as the 
total number of board members, and as such appears in previous research models related to 
political connections (e.g., Ding et al., 2014; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Furthermore, Yermack 
(1996) suggests that board size has a negative effect on performance since a greater number 
of board members leaves room for greater political interference. In addition, the proportion of 
women on boards is positively related to enterprise performance (Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2003; Catalyst, 2004). We therefore employ Board male as the percentage of men 
on board.  
Since SOEs differentiate among themselves, we employ several enterprise-level controls. 
SOEs are sometimes used for employment purposes, so it is often argued that an increase in 
the number of employees leads to lower performance results (Fan et al., 2007). Therefore, we 
employ Size, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees, to 
control for absolute availability of resources (e.g., Hu & Leung, 2012; Menozzi et al., 2011; 
Vining & Boardman, 1992; Zheng et al., 2015). Hannan and Freeman (1989) explain that 
dissolution risk is associated with years of existence. Hence, we control for the period of 
SOEs’ Existence, which is computed as the natural logarithm of the difference between years 
under investigation and year of SOE incorporation (e.g., Goldeng et al., 2004; Sun et al., 
2015; Tian & Lau, 2001). Additionally, Gilson (1990) indicates that board member changes 
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are common among financially distressed enterprises. We therefore control for Leverage as 
the measure of long-term debt over shareholders’ equity (e.g., Faccio, 2010). Furthermore, 
recognizing that differences across countries might impact our results and following prior 
literature (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012), we employ GDP, which represents the logarithm value 
of the gross domestic product at purchasing power parity (GDP PPP). We obtain data on 
GDP PPP from the World Bank online database. 
Methodology 
To identify whether board member changes are politically induced (Hypothesis 1), we run a 
following fixed effects model:  
= +  +  + + 
 +  +  +  +  + 
                                                                                        (1) 
where i is the SOE id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, and  denotes the error term. 
SOE specific fixed effects are captured by , while time-fixed effects are depicted by . 
Board member changes is a dependent variable represented by three measures, namely Board 
turnover, Board intermediary, and Board political turnover. We run the regressions only with 
parliamentary elections as it is not possible to distinguish between the effects of local and 
parliamentary elections in years in which they occur simultaneously. Due to the greater 
importance of parliamentary elections, we believe that they create more profound effects on 
board member changes. In our second estimation, the instrumental variables are 
Parliamentary and Local elections, which enable us to grasp and acknowledge their mutual 
effect.  
Significant coefficient for variable Parliamentary might indicate that board member changes 
are politically motivated. We assume no reverse causality, since board member changes 
21 
 
cannot influence the occurrence of elections. The occurrence of elections is prescribed by the 
constitution, while early elections are decided based on certain political or economic reasons 
and they are not announced because of the board member changes within SOEs. As it can be 
noted, variables Size and Performance are lagged, since these variables can have non-
instantaneous association with board member changes. Performance is represented by ROE 
and Sales per employee. 
To investigate the relationship between politically motivated board member changes and 
SOE performance (Hypothesis 2), we estimate the following equation: 
 =  +  +  +  
+  +  +  +  + 
 +                                (2) 
 
where i is the state-owned enterprise id, t is the year effect, α is the intercept, and  is the 
error term. Performance is a dependent variable that is represented by ROE and Sales per 
employee. Board member changes is an independent variable of our main interest and is 
represented by Board turnover, Board intermediary, and Board political turnover.  
Before choosing the estimation technique, we take into account that every research study on 
performance and board characteristics can suffer from endogeneity.4 For our model, the 
literature implies a possibility of reverse causality: the poor performance of enterprises could 
lead to board member changes. In order to address endogeneity issues, we estimate our 
models using a panel data IV estimator, which can be implemented by ivreg2h.5 This 
approach provides instruments identification when external instruments are not available or 
when there is a need to supplement external instruments with generated ones as to improve 
IV estimator efficiency (Baum, Lewbel, Schaffer, & Talavera, 2012; Lewbel, 2012). 
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The ivreg2h implements Lewbel’s (2012) generated instruments approach, which consists of 
two stages. In the first stage, each of the n endogenous variables ( ... ) is regressed on 
exogenous variables ( ... ) using OLS. The generated predicted residuals ( ... ) from 
this step are then multiplied by demeaned endogenous variables = (  - )  as to 
construct instrument vector ...  for each i ϵ 1...n. Within the second stage, we run the two-
step IV-GMM, where board member changes are treated as endogenous and are instrumented 
by the internally generated instruments. In addition to those instruments, we create a vector of 
externally selected instruments that are likely to have a direct effect on board member 
changes but not performance of SOEs. The instruments include Parliamentary and Local 
elections as they might create a non-instantaneous impact on SOE performance via board 
member changes. In addition, for estimations of Board turnover and Board political turnover, 
we use within-year board dynamics as an instrument.   
We first estimate model (2) for the whole sample and then we re-estimate it within two sets 
of sub-samples. To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, we divide our sample on the basis of median 
value for the number of employees. In that way we can investigate whether differences in 
political importance of large, and small and medium SOEs are present. Additionally, we want 
to recognise whether there are any differences among SOEs that are governed by different 
ownership models (Hypothesis 4). For that reason, we depict SOEs that are governed by two 
distinct and completely opposite ownership models - independent centralized body (Slovenia 
and Croatia) and government governance (Serbia and Montenegro). In all estimations with 
Board intermediary, we employ two additional variables, Board leavers and Board 
appointments, to grasp additional layers of board dynamics. 
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Sample and summary statistics  
Table 3 presents summary statistics for all variables in our estimations. In Panel A we report 
performance characteristics of SOEs. We can conclude that during the observed period the 
average financial SOE performance is negative since the average value of ROE is -5%. The 
average Sales per employee is equal to €190.72 ($225.29). Based on Panel D we can see that 
SOEs within our sample exist for 28 years on average and that they have on average 676 
employees. The average Leverage is 33%, which is similar to findings of previous research 
studies (e.g., 28.14% for politically connected enterprises (Faccio, 2010)). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports summary statistics for board characteristics. On average, boards of 
SOEs have five members, which is in line with good corporate governance practice suggested 
by OECD. Boards are male dominated since on average 81% of board members are men. The 
average Board tenure is approximately two years, while 0.33 board members spent less than 
one year on boards. The average turnover of all board members is 19%, which is almost 50% 
higher than what Franks and Mayer (2001) find for quoted German industrial and commercial 
enterprises. In addition, the average turnover of politically connected board members is 10%. 
On average, approximately 1.5 board members are appointed to boards each year, while 1.3 
board members leave the board.  
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
Table 4 presents further analysis of board member changes by country in the period 2010-
2014. Five out of six countries have average board turnover between 17% and 21%, while for 
other measures of board member changes analogous values are noted. Moreover, the 
24 
 
proportion of the total board members who left the board in each of the countries is 
approximately 60%.  Therefore, we can conclude that in countries within our sample, board 
member changes follow quite similar patterns, thus providing us with a unique set-up for 
investigation of political interference-performance relationship within SOEs. 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
Table 5 reports correlations among variables. The correlation coefficients do not raise any 
potential issues with multicollinearity. 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Figures 1 to 3 provide an overview of the proportion of board member changes by year and 
country, thus disclosing the link between board member changes and elections. They show 
that the proportion of board member changes increases in most cases during election and 
postelection years.6 Figure 1 points out that the proportion of Board turnovers is higher in 
seven out of nine election years and in five out of six postelection years. Similarly, the 
proportion of Board intermediary rises in four out of nine election years and in three out of 
six postelection years (Figure 2). In election years, the proportion of Board political turnover 
increases in five out of nine cases and in postelection years in five out of six cases, as 
outlined in Figure 3. Therefore, similarities among all three measures in election and 
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postelection years are observed, implying the existence of the link between the election 
cycles and board member changes within SOEs. 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows the relationship between elections and board member changes. We find that 
board member changes are higher during election years. In parliamentary election years 
Board turnover, Board intermediary, and Board political turnover increase by approximately 
9%, 23%, and 4% respectively. Moreover, previous year profitability (ROE) and productivity 
levels (Sales per employee) are insignificant. Hence, performance as a proxy of market force 
is not likely to induce board member changes within SOEs. These findings support our 
Hypothesis 1 and the contention of Vickers and Yarrow (1988) that board member changes 
within SOEs happen due to political rather than market forces. Moreover, these results 
validate the usage of election variables as instruments for board member changes. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
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Table 6 reveals one more important finding. The impact of Parliamentary elections is much 
greater for changes of all board members (9%) than for changes of only politically connected 
board members (4%). Thus, our results suggest that non-politically connected board members 
suffer from social distancing and guilt by association syndrome (Labianca & Brass, 2006; 
Yoshikawa et al., 2014). Yoshikawa et al. (2014) explain that outside board members without 
political connections are likely to be faced with social distancing since a powerful owner can 
replace them. The newly elected politicians assume that non-politically connected board 
members are loyal to previous political regimes, and with their change politicians want to 
avert any likelihood that their power might be destabilized (Dittmer & Wu, 1995). Therefore, 
our results uncover a potential existence of informal political ties within SOEs that go beyond 
the establishment of personal political ties. A larger magnitude of the Board intermediary 
change in election years (23% vs. 9% and 4%) might indicate that politicians have the 
tendency to appoint temporary boards with up to three-month tenures. The temporary boards 
enable politicians to take over the control of certain SOEs right after the elections while 
deciding which individuals deserve these positions in the long run based on their political 
loyalty and obedience.   
Other results from Table 6 show that Board tenure has a significant positive effect on Board 
turnover and Board political turnover. The increase in the time spent on boards implies that 
board members will be replaced as the end of their mandate is approaching. Contrary to that, 
Board tenure has a negative effect on Board intermediary. With increase in time spent on 
boards, fewer board members with tenures shorter than one year are replaced. The percentage 
of men on boards seems to have an insignificant effect, while increase in Board size increases 
the number of board member changes. Moreover, an upsurge in number of employees results 
in a lower number of board member changes. Fan et al. (2007) argue that evaluation of SOE 
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boards depends also on certain social responsibilities, such as an increase in employment 
levels. Hence, when employment levels are low there is a greater likelihood of a board 
member change. Within our estimations we employ variance inflation factors (VIF) and we 
find no evidence of multicollinearity. 
In order to prove consistency of the results presented in Table 6, we perform several 
robustness checks. First, we re-estimate the model (1) by controlling for leverage and the 
percentage of board members with PhD degrees. We observe consistent results regarding the 
impact of elections, which strengthens the argument that board member changes are 
politically induced. Interestingly, the percentage of board members with PhD degrees has 
negative significance for Board intermediary. Board members with higher qualifications are 
expected to possess a greater level of expertise and knowledge, and as such they are less 
likely to be replaced in short periods of time. Second, we check the possibility that the effect 
of Parliamentary elections is non-instantaneous through employment of lagged 
Parliamentary in model (1). We find negative significant coefficient for Board turnover, thus 
confirming the literature implication that politicians want to ensure position and power as 
soon as they are elected. The negative significance for Board intermediary supports the 
notion that politicians use temporary boards in election years. Moreover, we find insignificant 
coefficient for Board political turnover. Hence, results of this robustness check support 
results presented in Table 6. 
Table 7 presents the IV results for the board member changes-performance relationship. We 
find that political interference via board member changes deteriorates SOE performance. The 
estimates show a significant negative relationship between Board turnover and SOEs’ 
financial and operating performance, thus supporting our Hypothesis 2. Moreover, Board 
intermediary is negatively associated with financial performance and is insignificant for 
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operating performance of SOEs. The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that SOEs in our 
sample have on average five board members with average Board turnover of approximately 
20% (during one year one board member leaves the board). In terms of economic 
significance, the results from Table 7 imply that the change of one board member (Board 
turnover increase of 20 percentage points) results in a 3.2 percentage points decrease in ROE 
and 16.6% decrease in Sales per employee. The change of one board member with less than a 
year tenure decreases ROE by 0.01 percentage points. Contrary to that, we find that Board 
political turnover has negative but insignificant association with both financial and operating 
performance of SOEs. This might imply that non-politically connected board members 
represent a more valuable “asset” for SOEs. Previous studies point out that politically 
connected board members are appointed on the basis of their political loyalty and not their 
professional qualifications (Barberis et al., 1998). For that reason, their change might not 
influence performance of SOEs. However, we recognize that further analysis in this regard is 
needed as to be able to create a well-based conclusion. In spite of insignificance, the negative 
sign supports our findings of negative association between board member changes and 
performance of SOEs.  
 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
The negative association suggested by our results confirms findings of Crutchley et al. (2002) 
that greater stability of board membership enhances enterprise performance. Moreover, our 
results support Anderson and Chun (2014), who investigate the impact of board turnover on 
performance of the S&P 500 enterprises. Their results show that the lowest levels of 
performance are observed for enterprises in which five or more board members were changed 
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over three years. Essentially, frequent board member changes disrupt decision making, 
leaving procedures and implementation processes unattended (Sharma, 1985). The non-
existence of perfect substitution for individuals, as noted by Sharma (1985), postpones re-
establishment of efficient working dynamics within boards. In addition, frequent board 
member changes contribute to the lack of long-term perspective and dedication of individuals 
who sit on boards, thus disrupting creation of sound strategic orientation. Consequently, 
performance that is dependent from board member deliberation and board decisions is 
negatively affected by unstable board memberships that are politically induced. 
Table 7 also shows significant positive relationship between Board size and SOE operating 
performance. This result is different from findings of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and 
Menozzi et al. (2011), but it seems to support resource dependence theory in this regard. The 
theory asserts that larger boards are able to establish a greater number of external links, thus 
securing access to crucial resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Moreover, Board tenure is 
positively associated with performance of SOEs, since longer tenures imply greater 
familiarity of board members with business operations. We also find that board members 
leaving the board or being appointed to the board have negative effect on operating 
performance. This is related to the appearance of the time lag that represents the period of 
adjustment to the new board dynamics (Sharma, 1985). In addition, the presence of women 
on boards does not improve performance of SOEs.  
Results for control variables in Table 7 imply that larger SOEs have lower operating 
performance. Enterprise Existence indicates that older enterprises have higher levels of 
efficiency, probably due to better established procedures and prolonged market experience. 
Macroeconomic conditions (GDP) seem not to have an effect on performance, which is 
consistent with findings of previous research studies (e.g., Boubakri et al., 2012). Increase in 
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Leverage has a negative effect on financial performance, as it creates higher levels of 
financial distress while at the same time creating positive effects on productivity levels, likely 
due to investments in fixed assets, which improve efficiency.  
The robustness of these results is confirmed through re-estimation of the model (2) in several 
ways. First, we rerun the model with different macroeconomic control variables (e.g., real 
GDP, inflation) and enterprise level controls (e.g., total debt/equity as leverage measure, 
growth opportunities). The results of these regressions suggest the negative association 
between Board turnover/Board intermediary and SOE performance, thus supporting the 
findings presented above.  
Second, it is possible that our enterprise level and board level controls have the delayed effect 
on SOE performance. Therefore, we re-estimate the model (2) with lagged enterprise level 
controls. We find a significant negative relationship of Board turnover with both measures of 
performance. Board intermediary stays significant and negative for operating performance. In 
addition, we re-run the model (2) with lagged enterprise and board level controls. The 
significance of Board turnover in this estimation remains for financial performance, while 
Board intermediary loses its significance. Interestingly, the coefficient on Board political 
turnover becomes significant for financial performance. This result might imply that after 
controlling for certain delayed effects, the loss of certain political connections negatively 
affects SOE performance. The signs and significance for other variables in all robustness 
checks are quantitatively similar to the ones reported. 
Third, we try to complement our analysis on endogeneity using the difference-in-differences 
(DID) approach with fixed-effects regression. We create treatment group (countries with 
elections) and control group (countries without elections) and two interaction variables, 
Treatment*election and Treatment*postelection, for detecting the differentiating effect of 
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elections on the board member changes in the treatment versus the control group.7 The 
intertwined effects of parliamentary and local elections limit our ability to clearly specify the 
treatment effect. Consequently, the significance of our results is absent. Notwithstanding, the 
positive sign for both interaction variables suggests that in countries with elections, board 
member changes are higher in election and postelection years than in countries with no 
elections. 
The second step of our main analysis investigates whether the political importance of large 
SOEs alters the board member changes‒performance relationship. Our results in Table 8 
suggest a significant negative relation between board member changes and performance of 
small and medium SOEs and insignificant relation for large SOEs. These results are 
inconsistent with our Hypotheses 3a and 3b, and the findings of Bertrand et al. (2007), which 
assert that politicians use large SOEs to improve the likelihood of their re-election. However, 
our results are in line with findings of Wu et al. (2012), who analyse the impact of political 
connections on SOE performance in China. They explain that due to the importance of 
central SOEs (which are at the same time large) for the normal functioning of private 
enterprises, governments tend not to use those enterprises for fulfilment of their political 
goals. Garrone, Grilli, and Rouseseau (2013) find that the effect of political interference on 
large utility SOEs in Italy is uncertain. In addition, large enterprises are usually under the eye 
of the media (O’Connell, 1995), and politicians may opt not to reveal themselves and 
jeopardize their position. 
Contrary to the above, small and medium SOEs are used by local officials for personal and 
political goals to secure their political power (Wu et al., 2012). Jin, Yingyi, and Weingast 
(2005) reveal that local officials are politically pressured to increase local employment and 
they do so through SOEs. In addition, several other reasons might provide explanation for our 
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results. First, large SOEs have established procedures and systems that function despite board 
member changes, unlike small and medium size SOEs. Moreover, small and medium SOEs 
usually suffer from a lack of supervision and procedures, thus relying to a greater extent on 
board decision-making processes. Consequently, political interference via board member 
changes affects board deliberation, decision making, and performance of small and medium 
SOEs. The results for all other variables are consistent with the results for the whole sample. 
Table 8 also shows the Hausman test metrics that confirm the existence of statistically 
significant differences between coefficients from two sub-samples. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 8 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
Within the last step of our main analysis we determine whether different governing models 
for state ownership create any dissimilarities in the board member changes-performance 
relationship. Table 9 presents results for the centralized and government model. The results 
imply that for SOEs under the centralized model, politically induced board member changes 
are insignificant in terms of their performance. The insignificant result is in line with 
literature which suggests that independent body governing state ownership curtails 
opportunities for political interference within SOEs (Musacchio et al., 2015). Moreover, 
board nomination and appointment procedures within the centralized model are based on 
professional qualifications of individuals and not their political loyalty (World Bank, 2014). 
The results also imply positive board member changes-performance relationship in countries 
with government model. This result could be in line with the efforts of the governments of 
Serbia and Montenegro to professionalise board membership. Due to this result and its 
33 
 
implications we do not find the support for our Hypothesis 4. Other results in Table 9 are 
consistent with results for the whole sample such as enterprise size, enterprise existence, etc. 
As it can be noted, GDP and Leverage are excluded from re-estimations in both sub-samples. 
The reason for this is related to the significant drop in the number of observations, while the 
results of estimations with and without these variables are analogous. The estimations with 
GDP and Leverage are available upon request. We also observe significant statistical 
differences between sets of coefficients for these two sub-samples as indicated by Hausman 
test metrics. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Prior literature recognizes the general contingency of personal-level political ties and their 
values/costs for performance of enterprises, but it neglects the examination and analysis of 
their heterogeneity. Previous research studies fell short in recognizing the informal channels 
through which politicians and businesspeople might influence each other (Sun et al., 2015). 
Considering that, our study examines whether election cycles rather than market forces lead 
to board member changes as well as how these board member changes relate to the 
performance of 200 SOEs in six countries of the former SFRY.  
Overall, our results reveal that board member changes are politically motivated rather than 
performance induced. We also find that political interference via instable board membership 
is negatively associated with performance of SOEs. In addition, our findings imply that the 
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significance and magnitude of this association depends on the SOE’s political importance and 
ownership models. The results show that politically induced board member changes are 
insignificant for performance of large SOEs and SOEs governed by an independent 
government body.  
The empirical findings of this study have several important implications. They reveal a more 
nuanced picture of political tie heterogeneity and show another channel for political 
interference within SOEs. In that way, we extend the political embeddedness perspective by 
enabling multilevel investigation of political influence and its impact on the behaviour of 
SOEs. Unlike previous research studies, our study also acknowledges the importance of 
differentiation among government ownership ties on the basis of adopted ownership models. 
Our findings in this regard might have important implications for policymakers. In particular, 
the results show that policymakers should adopt a centralized ownership model to create a 
shield from political interference. Recognizing that a centralized ownership model might not 
be appropriate for all countries due to their specificities, policymakers can at least ensure that 
appointment of board members is based on knowledge, skills, and competences rather than 
political allegiance. 
Even though we have undertaken a careful analysis we acknowledge that our study has 
several limitations that suggest implications for future research. First, further examination of 
the characteristics of replaced board members (e.g., expertise, work experience) will enrich 
the understanding of why board member changes increase in years of elections. Second, in 
our study we do not take into account that board member changes might depend on distinct 
personal political ties. For example, board members working in private enterprises with 
political connections are less likely to be replaced than government officials with direct 
political ties. Such analysis would provide us with insights regarding the underlying 
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mechanisms of politically induced board member changes. Third, as noted within the political 
embeddedness perspective, political ties create certain benefits as well as costs. Therefore, 
empirical research that would disentangle benefits and costs of individual board replacements 
in years of elections would provide us with better understanding of the impact of politically 
induced board member changes on SOE performance.    
 
 
ENDNOTES
                                                          
1  The total number of SOEs ranges from 15 in Montenegro to at least 80 in Slovenia. For 
example, level of state ownership in Slovenia is one of the highest among OECD 
countries. In 2012, the SOE sector in Slovenia accounted for 11% of the total employment, 
which is three times higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2014). Moreover, in the same 
year SOEs in Serbia and Croatia employed 7% and 6.3% of the total employment 
respectively (Arsic, 2012; Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2012; DUUDI, 2013). 
Governments have a majority state ownership in strategically important SOEs (e.g., 
energy, transport, telecommunication, utilities) that contribute to the overall functioning of 
their economies. 
2    Our definition of politically connected board members takes into consideration definitions 
of political connectedness from previous literature (e.g., Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 2010; 
Menozzi et al., 2011; Zheng et al., 2015). Hence, within the scope of our study we define 
politically connected board members as: (1) those who hold or held position in central or 
local government, parliament, or some other governmental body; (2) those who are 
members of the political party; (3) those who participated in election cycles as citizen 
representatives; (4) those who have close relationships (e.g., relatives, friends) with 
current/past government/parliament officials or political party representatives. 
3  The dummy variable for parliamentary elections takes value one for the following years 
and countries: 2010-Bosnia and Herzegovina; 2011-Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Slovenia; 
2012-Serbia, Montenegro; 2014-Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Serbia, 
Slovenia. Following the same approach, the dummy variable for local elections takes value 
one in: 2010-Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia; 2012-Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Serbia; 2013-Croatia, FYR Macedonia; 2014-Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia. 
Both of these dummy variables are time variant. 
4   Endogeneity appears whenever the expected value of the error term is not equal zero and 
when there is a correlation between independent variable and the error term. This can be 
caused by one of the following: (1) omitted variable - a variable that is relevant cannot be 
measured and proper proxy cannot be found; (2) measurement error in regressor; and (3) 
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reverse causality. Research papers that investigated the political interference-performance 
relationship independently from the econometric methodology and measure of political 
interference that they employ all acknowledge possible presence of endogeneity within 
their estimations. For further reference please see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010), 
Hu and Leung (2012), Ding et al. (2014), Menozzi et al. (2011), and O’Connell and 
Cramer (2010). 
5    ivreg2h is an instrumental variables estimation using heteroscedasticity based instruments 
and Stata command that was written by Baum and Schaffer (2012). ivreg2h uses a two-
step GMM estimation. This technique was used by several researchers (e.g., Bremus and 
Buch, 2015; Mishra and Smyth, 2015). 
6    For countries where elections happened at the beginning or end of the observed period, we 
are not able to observe prior or post levels of board member changes. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the elections took place in 2010, so we cannot observe whether the level of 
board member changes increased due to the lack of data for 2009. Therefore, we count out 
this election year when we calculate the number of years in which there was an increase of 
board member changes in an election year. We apply same reasoning for postelection 
years for which the data is not available, and we therefore discuss nine election years and 
six postelection years in Figures 1, 2, and 3. Since these cases represent the minority, we 
do not have a reason to believe that they would significantly change our conclusion. 
7    We create the treatment and control group by using binary variable Treatment, which takes 
value 1 for enterprises in Serbia and Montenegro (treatment group) and 0 for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (control group). We also create the Election dummy variable, which takes 
value 1 for 2012 and 0 otherwise. This is due to the fact that in Serbia and Montenegro, 
parliamentary elections were held in 2012 and in the same year there were no 
parliamentary elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, we create a Postelection 
dummy variable which takes value 1 for 2013 and 0 otherwise. Both of these variables are 
employed within our estimation in order to control for time trends. We also create two 
interaction variables, Treatment*election and Treatment*postelection, to be able to detect 
differentiating effect of elections on the board member changes in the treatment group 
versus the control group. Before estimating our models, we match enterprises in terms of 
size and industry. The underlying reason for insignificance of interaction coefficients is 
related to intertwined effects of parliamentary and local elections. Considering that 
parliamentary and local elections happen in different years in different countries, it is quite 
difficult to depict the treatment and control groups in which board member changes are not 
influenced by effects of some post or pre-election cycles. Therefore, differentiating effect 
of the treatment becomes insignificant due to the decrease in difference between board 
member changes within the treatment and control group. We tried re-estimating the model 
with different specification of the treatment and control groups. In all cases, the interaction 
variables have positive sign but remain insignificant, which additionally confirms the 
interplay of post and/or pre-election effects. 
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TABLE 1 
Governing models for state ownership, appointment procedures and criteria for board membership 
 
Governance model adopted Procedure for appointment of board members Criteria for board membership 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Decentralized ownership model 
Line ministries are responsible for 
monitoring and exercising ownership 
rights. 
Line ministries create decision proposals on appointment of board 
members. The proposal is sent to shareholders assembly for confirmation. 
The details about procedures are stipulated in the Law on SOEs in 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Official Gazzete of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012). 
Aside from the general provisions within the 
laws detailed criteria for board membership is 
not stated and the criteria is usually determined 
by line ministries for each individual public call.  
Croatia Centralized ownership model 
Independent government body DUUDI 
is responsible for monitoring and 
exercising ownership rights.  
The procedure for appointment of supervisory board members is initiated 
by line ministry, but DUUDI conducts the public call. After public call 
DUUDI creates a proposal with justification for each candidate and this 
proposal is then forwarded to government for adoption.  
Criteria for board membership is determined by 
government through adoption of the official 
decision in which position requirements are 
defined e.g., educational level, expertise 
(Narodne novine, 2012). 
FYR Macedonia Decentralized ownership model 
Line ministries are responsible for 
monitoring and exercising the 
ownership rights. 
Line ministries create proposals of decisions on appointment of board 
members. The proposal is sent to the government for adoption. The details 
about procedures are stipulated in the Law on public enterprises in 
Macedonia (Official Gazzete of the FYR Macedonia, 2013). 
Aside from the general provisions within the 
laws detailed criteria for board membership is 
not stated and the criteria is usually determined 
by line ministries for each public call.  
Montenegro Government ownership model 
The quasi decentralized model in which 
de facto the government governs SOEs, 
while de jure line ministries are 
responsible. 
The line ministry prepares a call for appointment of board members.  
Governmental committee or office for appointments takes over the call, 
announces the process, governs the procedure and decides on candidates 
to be proposed. The final decision on appointment is made by government 
and sent to shareholders assembly for confirmation.  
The only criteria stated in legal provisions is that 
board members cannot work for SOEs' auditor, 
perform duty of executive director or be 
convicted for any crime. 
Serbia Government ownership model 
The quasi decentralized model in which 
de facto the government governs SOEs, 
while de jure line ministries are 
responsible. 
The line ministry prepares a call for appointment of board members.  
Governmental committee or office for appointments takes over the call, 
announces the process, governs the procedure and decides on candidates 
to be proposed. The final decision on appointment is made by government 
and sent to shareholders assembly for confirmation. 
Criteria for appointment of board members such 
as education, work experience and level of 
expertise is stated in legal provisions of Serbian 
laws (e.g., Law on SOEs). 
Slovenia Centralized ownership 
Independent government body called 
Slovenian Sovereign Holding is 
responsible for monitoring and 
exercising ownership rights. 
Personal commission within Slovenian Sovereign Holding carries out 
recruitment process for supervisory board membership and sends 
proposals to shareholders assembly for confirmation (Slovenian Sovereign 
Holding, 2011). 
The Slovenian Sovereign Holding's Rules on 
supervisory board member selection and other 
regulatory documents provide detailed criteria 
for supervisory board membership (e.g., level of 
education, work experience, postulates about 
non-political involvement etc). 
Notes: Description of governing models for state ownership, appointment procedures, and criteria for board membership in six countries of the former SFRY for the period 2010-2014.
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TABLE 2 
Board and ownership characteristics 
 
Notes: Board and ownership characteristics of 200 SOEs from six countries of the former SFRY. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ONE TIER VS. TWO TIER 
Number of SOEs with one-tier board system Number of SOEs with two-tier board system 
14 186 
 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Number of SOEs with 100% state 
ownership 
Number of SOEs with minority 
shareholder 
Number of SOEs with significant 
minority shareholder 
102 98 12 
 
ORIGIN OF SIGNIFICANT MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
Domestic Foreign 
3 9 
 
OWNERSHIP ENTITY 
Direct government control Indirect government control via local self-government 
102 SOEs 98 SOEs 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for key variables. The sample covers 200 state-owned enterprises from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia for the period 2010-2014. Please note that for the variables that 
are used in logarithm form within our estimations in this table we report non-logarithm values. Panel A reports the summary statistics for 
state-owned enterprise performance variables. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural 
logarithm of sales over the total number of employees. In panel B the summary statistics for board level variables are reported. Board 
turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at 
least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter 
than one year. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically 
connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board size is the total number of board 
members. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Board tenure is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board 
appointments is the number of board members appointed to the board within one year. Board leavers is the number of board members 
that left the board within one year. Panel C reports the summary statistics for political interference variables. Parliamentary is a dummy 
variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. Local is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of local 
elections. In Panel D the summary statistics for control variables are reported. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference 
between years under investigation and year of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. 
Leverage is equal to long-term debt over shareholders equity. GDP is the logarithm of GDP PPP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std Obs 
Panel A: Performance measures 
ROE -0.05 0.22 957 
Sales per employee 190.72 919.24 971 
Panel B: Board level measures 
Board turnover 0.19 0.27 1,000 
Board intermediary 0.33 1.12 1,000 
Board political turnover 0.10 0.18 1,000 
Board size 5.38 3.10 1,000 
Board male 0.81 0.19 919 
Board tenure 2.12 1.21 919 
Board appointments 1.53 2.19 1,000 
Board leavers 1.33 2.05 1,000 
Panel C: Political interference measures 
Parliamentary 0.34 0.47 1,000 
Local 0.28 0.45 1,000 
Panel D: Control variables 
Existence 28.12 23.99 977 
Size 675.53 1517.72 989 
Leverage 0.33 0.64 817 
GDP 55847.84 24252.24 1,000 
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TABLE 4 
 Board member changes per country 
Notes: Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at 
least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one 
year. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who 
left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. 
MEAN VALUES OF BOARD MEMBER CHANGES PER COUNTRY 
 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
FYR 
Macedonia 
Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
Board turnover 0.17 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.20 0.18 
Board intermediary 0.25 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.58 0.32 
Board political 
turnover 
0.09 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.07 
PROPORTION OF CHANGED BOARD MEMBERS 
 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Croatia 
FYR 
Macedonia 
Montenegro Serbia Slovenia 
Total number of board 
members 
474 620 40 144 148 694 
Number of board 
members who left the 
board 
306 383 40 81 90 427 
Proportion of board 
members who left the 
board 
64.56% 61.77% 100% 56.25% 62.50% 61.53% 
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TABLE 5 
Pearson's correlation matrix 
Notes: †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001.
Variable 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. ROE 1.0000                
2. Sales per employee 0.1210*** 1.0000                
3. Board turnover 0.0220 0.0306 1.0000               
4. Board intermediary -0.0653 0.0301 0.4361***    1.0000             
5.Board political turnover 0.0295 -0.0067 0.8040 ***  0.3062*** 1.0000            
6. Board size 0.0319 0.3255*** 0.3619***    0.3299***  0.3032*** 1.0000           
7. Board male 0.0922** 0.0496 -0.0453   -0.0033 -0.0164 0.0380 1.000          
8. Board tenure 0.0648† -0.0157 -0.0593   -0.2337*** -0.0065 -0.1897*** 0.0652  1.0000         
9. Board appointments -0.0322 0.0951*** 0.3329***   0.4947*** 0.2596*** 0.6047*** -0.0221 -0.4615*** 1.0000        
10. Board leavers  0.0027 0.1219*** 0.8366***    0.4778*** 0.6792*** 0.6535*** -0.0331   -0.1429*** 0.5496*** 1.0000       
11. Parliamentary  0.0031 0.0047 0.0604**    0.0229 0.0294 -0.0719* -0.0155 0.0363 -0.0781* 0.0002 1.0000      
12. Local  0.0096 0.1129*** -0.0130   -0.0134   -0.0194  0.0125  0.0093  -0.0210 0.0080 -0.0236 -0.0660* 1.0000     
13. Existence 0.0197 0.2079*** -0.0585†   -0.0805*  -0.0422 0.1168*** 
    
0.0782* 0.1066** -0.0348 -0.0230 0.0053 0.0158 1.0000    
14. Size 0.0200 0.0820* 0.0219    0.0826**   0.0231 0.3353*** 0.2403*** -0.733* 0.1745*** 0.1417*** -0.0419 0.0055 0.1910*** 1.0000   
15. Leverage -0.2327*** 0.1342*** 0.0275 0.0913*** -0.0012 0.1360*** 0.0327 -0.0504 0.1038** 0.0892* -0.0251 -0.0252 -0.1277*** 0.1731*** 1.0000  
16. GDP 0.0248 0.2613*** 0.0102 0.0248 -0.0171 0.2238*** 0.0216 -0.0888** 0.1081*** 0.0816** -0.0046 -0.0189 0.2413*** 0.1681*** 0.1834*** 1.0000 
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TABLE 6 
Effect of elections on board member changes 
 
                               
BOARD 
TURNOVER 
BOARD 
INTERMEDIARY 
BOARD  
POLITICAL 
TURNOVER  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parliamentary                0.088***      0.093***     0.233** 0.235** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
                               (0.022) (0.023) (0.091) (0.091) (0.014) (0.015) 
Board size                        0.081***      0.081***     0.226***    0.223*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 
                               (0.007) (0.007) (0.060) (0.059) (0.005) (0.005) 
Board tenure                   0.048***      0.049**    -0.177** -0.182** 0.035*** 0.037*** 
                               (0.014) (0.015) (0.061) (0.059) (0.011) (0.011) 
Board male -0.045 -0.066 -0.227 -0.232 -0.063 -0.078 
                               (0.121) (0.123) (0.311) (0.318) (0.077) (0.079) 
Size (lagged)                 -0.072** -0.073* -0.160 -0.108 -0.004 0.001 
                               (0.025) (0.032) (0.142) (0.141) (0.014) (0.018) 
ROE (lagged) 0.000  0.023  -0.010  
                               (0.073)  (0.218)  (0.048)  
Sales per 
employee (lagged)           
 0.016  0.123  0.024 
                                (0.033)  (0.105)  (0.028) 
       
No. of Obs.                    722 732 722 732 722 732 
R2 Within 0.30 0.29 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.22 
Prob>F                 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Mean VIF 1.10 1.18 1.10 1.18 1.10 1.18 
Notes: The table presents the results for the relationship between board member changes and election cycles. Fixed effects panel data was 
used. First panel (columns (1) and (2)) show results for the board turnover-election relationship. Second panel (columns (3) and (4)) present 
results for the board intermediary-election relationship. Third panel (columns (5) and (6)) present results for the board political turnover-
election relationship. In columns (1), (3) and (5) lagged ROE is performance measure. In columns (2), (4) and (6) lagged Sales per employee 
is performance measure. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not reported. 
†p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who 
left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in 
the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Parliamentary 
is a dummy variable which takes value 1 in years of parliamentary elections. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure 
is the average time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Size is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of employees. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity. Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales 
over the total number of employees.  
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TABLE 7 
Effect of board member changes on SOE performance: Whole sample 
 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance. IV estimation using 
heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) was used. In columns (1) and (2) Board turnover is the measure of board member 
changes. In columns (3) and (4) Board political turnover is the measure of board member changes. In columns (5) and (6) Board 
intermediary is the measure of board member changes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant 
term is estimated but not reported. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity and 
is dependent variables in columns (1), (3) and (5). Sales per employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of 
employees and is dependent variable in columns (2), (4) and (6). Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board 
members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board political turnover is 
the percentage of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the 
year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board members who left in the observed 
year with tenures shorter than one year. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year 
of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Leverage is equal to long-term debt over 
shareholders equity. GDP is the logarithm of GDP PPP. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average 
time that board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Board leavers is the number of board 
members that left the board within one year. Board appointments is the number of board members appointed to the board within one 
year.  
 
                               
ROE 
Sales per 
employee 
ROE Sales per 
employee 
ROE Sales per 
employee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Board turnover -0.158† -0.826*     
 (0.094) (0.426)     
Board political turnover          -0.205 -0.983   
                                 (0.147) (0.685)   
Board intermediary     -0.010* 0.011 
     (0.018) 0.077 
Existence -0.036* 0.216** -0.037* 0.213** -0.027 0.213*** 
 (0.016) (0.069) (0.017) (0.073) (0.016) (0.066) 
Size                     -0.010 -0.113** -0.008 -0.101* -0.003 -0.119** 
                               (0.009) (0.046) (0.009) (0.045) (0.010) (0.043) 
Leverage -0.096** 0.175** -0.100*** 0.157* -0.096** 0.194** 
 (0.031) (0.066) (0.031) (0.067) (0.030) (0.064) 
GDP 0.028 0.184 0.030 0.200 0.036 0.148 
 (0.027) (0.123) (0.027) (0.125) (0.027) (0.123) 
Board size             0.009* 0.171*** 0.009 0.164*** -0.001 0.249*** 
                               (0.005) (0.026) (0.006) (0.028) (0.008) (0.032) 
Board tenure                   0.020* 0.011 0.023** 0.024 0.021* -0.049 
                               (0.009) (0.047) (0.009) (0.046) (0.009) (0.052) 
Board male 0.123† -0.067 0.135* -0.004 0.136** -0.020 
                               (0.068) (0.340) (0.067) (0.338) (0.063) (0.341) 
Board leavers     0.009 -0.100** 
                                   (0.010) (0.040) 
Board appointments     -0.000 -0.101** 
     (0.008) (0.040) 
       
No. of Obs.                    427 424     427 424 427 424 
Mean VIF 1.36 1.37 1.35 1.35 1.81 1.82 
       
Underidentification LM 
statistic P val 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hansen J statistic P val 0.98 0.12 0.56 0.02 0.51 0.09 
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Table 8 
Effect of board member changes on SOE performance: Differences between small and medium SOEs and large SOEs 
                               ROE 
Panel 1 
Sales per employee 
Panel 2 
ROE 
Panel 3 
Sales per employee 
Panel 4 
ROE 
Panel 5 
Sales per employee 
Panel 6 
 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
Small and 
medium 
SOEs 
Large 
SOEs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Board turnover -0.126 -0.044 -1.189** -0.457         
 (0.110) (0.121) (0.505) (0.515)         
Board political turnover             -0.307 -0.067 -1.199 -1.171     
                                   (0.217) (0.175) (0.866) (0.735)     
Board intermediary         -0.031† -0.019 -0.029 -0.005 
                                       (0.018) (0.025) (0.128) (0.061) 
Existence 0.023 -0.005 0.425*** 0.150* 0.017 -0.006 0.442*** 0.116 0.026 0.001 0.443*** 0.121† 
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.114) (0.070) (0.028) (0.020) (0.118) (0.076) (0.025) (0.019) (0.111) (0.063) 
Size                     0.032 -0.012 -0.227** -0.121* 0.031 -0.012 -0.204* -0.143* 0.038† -0.006 -0.193* -0.142** 
                               (0.023) (0.017) (0.096) (0.060) (0.022) (0.018) (0.092) (0.062) (0.022) (0.018) (0.090) (0.058) 
Board size             0.006 0.002 0.245*** 0.129*** 0.009 0.002 0.233*** 0.141*** 0.004 -0.007 0.285*** 0.211*** 
                               (0.007) (0.007) (0.035) (0.031) (0.008) (0.007) (0.038) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.044) (0.031) 
Board tenure                   0.021* 0.016 -0.063 0.096† 0.021* 0.017 -0.041 0.107† 0.019† 0.013 -0.103* 0.046 
                               (0.011) (0.013) (0.049) (0.058) (0.011) (0.013) (0.048) (0.059) (0.011) (0.014) (0.051) (0.063) 
Board male 0.009 0.179 -0.285 0.299 -0.002 0.186† -0.234 0.418 0.015 0.189† -0.194 0.377 
                               (0.073) (0.111) (0.396) (0.410) (0.075) (0.110) (0.396) (0.412) (0.067) (0.103) (0.397) (0.406) 
Board leavers         0.008 0.018 -0.049 -0.103** 
                                       (0.013) (0.013) (0.060) (0.040) 
Board appointments         -0.003 -0.001 -0.104† -0.065† 
         (0.013) (0.011) (0.059) (0.037) 
             
No. of Obs.                    254 275 262 273 254 275 262 273 254 275 262 273 
Mean VIF 1.28 1.23 1.28 1.23 1.28 1.21 1.28 1.21 1.73 1.74 1.73 1.75 
Hausman 18.90** 97.01*** 22.02*** 32.83*** 17.71**        86.73*** 
Underidentification LM 
statistic P val 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Hansen J statistic P val 0.72 0.79 0.49 0.16 0.78 0.83 0.47 0.31 0.70 0.65 0.12 0.06 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance for two sub-samples: small and medium SOEs and large SOEs. IV estimation 
using heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) was used. Panel 1, Panel 3 and Panel 5 present results for the board member changes-ROE relationship for both sub-samples. 
Panel 2, Panel 4 and Panel 6 present results for board member changes-sales per employee relationship for both sub-samples. Hausman is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman type test for 
differences between two sets of coefficients (Chi-square value reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term is estimated but not 
reported. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity and is dependent variables in odd columns. Sales per employee is the natural 
logarithm of sales over the total number of employees and is dependent variable in even columns.  Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of board members in the 
observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the number of board 
members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and year of SOE 
incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time that board members 
spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Board leavers is the number of board members that left the board within one year. Board appointments is the 
number of board members appointed to the board within one year. 
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Table 9 
Effect of board member changes on SOE performance: Differences between centralized and government model 
                               ROE 
Panel 1 
Sales per employee 
Panel 2 
ROE 
Panel 3 
Sales per employee 
Panel 4 
ROE 
Panel 5 
Sales per employee 
Panel 6 
 
Centralized 
model 
Government 
model 
Centralized 
model 
Government 
model 
Centralized 
model 
Government 
model 
Centralized 
model 
Government 
model 
Centralized  
model 
Government 
model 
Centralized 
model 
Government 
model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Board turnover -0.220 0.509* -0.130 0.588         
 (0.168) (0.240) (0.516) (0.854)         
Board political turnover             -0.282 0.308 -1.354 1.087     
                                   (0.219) (0.205) (0.900) (1.097)     
Board intermediary         -0.028 0.047 -0.046 0.179† 
                                       (0.018) (0.029) (0.061) (0.103) 
Existence 0.028 0.001 0.231** 0.266** 0.031 -0.005 0.190* 0.310** 0.045* -0.014 0.232** 0.228** 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.094) (0.094) (0.021) (0.027) (0.095) (0.111) (0.021) (0.020) (0.086) (0.085) 
Size                     -0.004 0.026 -0.170*** -0.209† -0.004 0.014 -0.186*** -0.216† 0.001 0.018 -0.170*** -0.253** 
                               (0.013) (0.034) (0.054) (0.119) (0.012) (0.036) (0.054) (0.117) (0.012) (0.036) (0.051) (0.098) 
Board size             0.003 -0.041† 0.036 0.155* 0.002 -0.024 0.068* 0.149* -0.015† -0.033 0.035 0.264*** 
                               (0.008) (0.022) (0.031) (0.068) (0.008) (0.019) (0.033) (0.064) (0.008) (0.026) (0.035) (0.055) 
Board tenure                   -0.002 0.012 0.006 0.128 0.002 -0.003 0.014 0.106 0.002 0.004 -0.006 0.070 
                               (0.013) (0.034) (0.068) (0.090) (0.013) (0.032) (0.072) (0.089) (0.014) (0.034) (0.083) (0.091) 
Board male 0.156 0.006 0.353 -0.573 0.180† 0.001 0.329 -0.681 0.198* 0.033 0.372 -0.504 
                               (0.103) (0.187) (0.440) (0.828) (0.095) (0.194) (0.426) (0.789) (0.090) (0.184) (0.421) (0.767) 
Board leavers         0.014 0.021 0.008 -0.086 
                                       (0.012) (0.030) (0.041) (0.072) 
Board appointments         0.008 -0.009 -0.005 -0.091 
         (0.011) (0.020) (0.046) (0.060) 
             
No. of Obs.                    305 73 306 73 305 73 306 73 305 73 306 73 
Mean VIF 1.40 1.41 1.40 1.41 1.41 1.39 1.41 1.39 1.94 1.96 1.94 1.96 
Hausman 50.08*** 26.77*** 44.99*** 23.73*** 84.04*** 878.05*** 
Underidentification LM 
statistic P val 
0.01 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 
Hansen J statistic P val 0.49 0.22 0.00 0.38 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.44 0.14 0.00 0.26 
Notes: The table presents the results for estimation of board member changes and SOE performance for two sub-samples: centralized governance model and government governance 
model. IV estimation using heteroskedasticity-based instruments (ivreg2h) was used. Panel 1, Panel 3 and Panel 5 present results for the board member changes-ROE relationship 
for both sub-samples. Panel 2, Panel 4 and Panel 6 present results for board member changes-sales per employee relationship for both sub-samples. Hausman is the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman type test for differences between two sets of coefficients (Chi-square value reported). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In all regressions a constant term 
is estimated but not reported. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. ROE is the ratio of net income to average total equity and is dependent variables in odd columns. Sales per 
employee is the natural logarithm of sales over the total number of employees and is dependent variable in even columns.  Board turnover is the percentage of the total number of 
board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board political turnover is the percentage of the total number of 
board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the board. Board intermediary shows the 
number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year. Existence is the natural logarithm of the difference between years under investigation and 
year of SOE incorporation. Size is the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. Board size is the total number of board members. Board tenure is the average time that 
board members spent on the board. Board male is the percentage of men on board. Board leavers is the number of board members that left the board within one year. Board 
appointments is the number of board members appointed to the board within one year.  
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FIGURE 1 
Proportion of board turnovers per year and country 
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Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members in the observed year who left at the end of the year after spending at least one year on the 
board.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Proportion of board intermediary per year and country 
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Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members who left in the observed year with tenures shorter than one year.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Proportion of board political turnovers per year and country 
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Notes: Proportion of the total number of board members in the observed year who are politically connected and who left at the end of the year after 
spending at least one year on the board. 
 
55 
 
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY 
Tanja Kuzman is a Doctoral Researcher in Finance at the Management School, University of 
Sheffield, UK. Her broad research interests are related to corporate finance, corporate 
governance, behaviour of state-owned enterprises, political embeddedness, big-data analytics, 
start-up financing, and transition economies. She was a Marie Curie Fellow on EU-funded 
GREY project and a consultant on several corporate governance projects of the International 
Finance Corporation, the World Bank Group.   
 
Oleksandr Talavera is a Professor of Finance at the School of Management, Swansea 
University, UK and he is also the director of the Hawkes Centre for Empirical Finance. 
Oleksandr is broadly interested in empirical corporate finance, online-prices, big data 
analytics, banking, international finance, and emerging market economies. His research has 
been published in the American Economic Review, Journal of European Economic 
Association, Journal of Banking and Finance, and Journal of Comparative Economics. 
 
Sotirios K. Bellos is a Lecturer at the International Faculty-CITY College, University of 
Sheffield, where he teaches Monetary Economics, Banking and International Finance. His 
research interests lie in the field of finance and its association with macroeconomics, as well 
as FDI and geo-economics.  His research work has appeared in the Bulletin of Economic 
Research, International Review of Applied Economics and Foreign Affairs. He also holds a 
position of Sector Head in the Corporate Restructuring Division of National Bank of Greece. 
 
 
